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CONCEALING COLLUSION: THE SUEZ CRISIS, POLITICAL 






The Suez crisis in 1956 has long been recognised as a watershed in British history—
precipitating the fall of Anthony Eden’s government, accelerating the end of empire, 
and underscoring how weak Britain had become on the international stage, especially 
in relation to the United States, which emerged from the episode as undeniably the 
senior partner in the ‘Special Relationship’. Less understood is the important role that 
the crisis played in weakening the foundations of official secrecy in Britain, especially 
what might be described as the social underpinnings of secrecy. This article explores 
how sensitive details about Suez eventually came to light in the period 1956 to 1969, 
despite concerted and sometimes cunning efforts by the Whitehall machine to prevent 
disclosure. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which suggests that socialist 
parliamentary firebrands like Michael Foot proved the most difficult to control, it is 
argued that the greatest challenge to secret-keepers came from senior conservative 
politicians writing memoirs—chief among them Eden himself—who were 
headstrong, not easily intimidated, and unafraid to bypass rules and codes of 
discretion to vindicate their careers. Fascinatingly, memoir writers not only ignored 
legal mechanisms like the much-feared Official Secrets Act, but, against the backdrop 
of profound social and cultural change, they also dismissed attempts by mandarins to 
exploit gentlemanly bonds and loyalties, which in the past had been an effective 
method of promoting self-censorship by members of the elite. 
 
On 22 October 1956, with orders from the Conservative Prime Minister Anthony 
Eden, the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, and his Assistant Private Secretary, 
Donald Logan, travelled in conditions of the utmost secrecy to a private villa in 
Sèvres on the outskirts of Paris, once used as a safe house for resistance fighters 
during the war, to hatch a plan with French and Israeli officials to invade Egypt and 
seize the nationalised Suez Canal. Anxious for his movements to go unnoticed, Lloyd 
donned a tatty mackintosh and Foreign Office officials were fed the bogus story that 
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he was at home with a cold—although his cover was almost blown by a near-miss car 
accident on the journey from the French airport. Britain’s co-conspirators took similar 
security precautions, with the Israeli prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, arriving with 
a hat pulled down to cover his white hair and his chief of staff, General Moshe Dayan, 
wearing dark glasses to hide his signature eye-patch.1  
Three days of talks led to the agreement, on 24 October, that Israel would 
attack the Egyptian Army near Suez; then—with the casus belli established—Britain 
and France would intervene as peacemakers on the pretext of separating the 
combatants and protecting the international waterway. Before opening a bottle of 
champagne to celebrate, the French and Israelis, keen to hold the British to their word, 
demanded that all parties sign a document setting out the terms of their audacious 
plot. Written in French and typed in three copies in the villa’s kitchen, the so-called 
‘Sèvres Protocol’ was signed by Ben-Gurion, the French foreign minister Christian 
Pineau, and the senior Foreign Office official Patrick Dean. That evening, in Downing 
Street, Eden was vexed to discover that a written record of the collusion existed. The 
British copy was immediately burned in the grate at Number 10; and, in 
circumstances mixing diplomatic skulduggery with Keystone Cops mishaps, Dean 
and Logan were ordered back to Paris the next morning to engineer a similar fate for 
the French and Israeli copies. After waiting for hours without food or drink in a 
locked reception room at the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the two envoys 
were told by Pineau—‘coldly’—that the French would not surrender their copy and 
that Ben-Gurion had already left for Israel, with his guarantee against possible British 
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disloyalty securely tucked in his waistcoat pocket.2   ‘We got a flea in our ear’, 
recalled Logan. 
Eden’s secret was far from safe. As soon as the war broke out, on schedule, on 
29 October, rumours of a prearranged tripartite agreement began to circulate. As Scott 
Lucas has noted, the disguise of ‘peacekeeping’ in the Middle East fooled no one, 
since it patently helped the Israelis to move into Egyptian territory.3 On 31 October, 
in parliament, the Leader of the Labour Opposition, Hugh Gaitskell, declared that ‘the 
whole business was a matter of collusion between the British and French governments 
and the Government of Israel’. 4  Anglo-French–Israeli connivance was widely 
suspected by the Americans: both the State Department and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) had reached this conclusion after detecting a spike in cipher traffic 
between Paris and Tel Aviv.5 ‘Stories of collusion between French and ourselves and 
Israelis are spreading widely’, the British Embassy in Washington cabled Lloyd.6 
Reminiscing some years later, Robert Amory, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
from 1952 to 1962, claimed that the CIA Director, Allen Dulles, had been so 
convinced of foul play by Eden that, after consulting the Secretary of State (his 
brother John Foster Dulles), he ‘ordered the initiation of clandestine espionage for the 
first time since the American Revolution and War of 1812 against British forces’, 
concentrating efforts in Malta, Cyprus and Crete.7 
With no smoking gun, let alone direct evidence, the coterie of senior ministers 
and civil servants who knew the truth closed ranks behind the fiction. ‘There was no 
prior agreement between us about it’, Lloyd said on two occasions in the Commons, 
                                                        
2 D.R. Thorpe, Eden: The Life and Times of Anthony Eden (London, 2003), p. 517; TNA, FCO 73/205, Patrick 
Dean, ‘Visit to Sèvres on 24 Oct. 1956’, 24 May 1978.  
3 S. Lucas, Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar (Manchester, 1996).  
4 Thorpe, Eden, p. 517.  
5 Ibid., p. 520.  
6 Black, ‘Secrets and Lies’.  
7  Princeton University, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Robert B. Bowie Papers, ML.2016.029, 




on 31 October and 5 December.8 On 20 December, in his last appearance in the 
House, Eden forcefully denied any wrongdoing: ‘There was not foreknowledge that 
Israel would attack Egypt—there was not’.9  
In parallel with the deception of parliament, lies and misinformation were 
spread in other directions. In private discussions with the American ambassador in 
London, Lloyd ‘said categorically that his recent conversations with the French gave 
no reason to think the French were stimulating such an Israeli venture’.10 Tony Shaw 
has demonstrated that the Information Policy Department at the Foreign Office 
concocted a number of disingenuous press releases designed to ‘kill the collusion 
bogey’, including the line that if there really had been collusion, then surely Anglo-
French military action would have been better timed (referring to the delay between 
the first bombings and the actual landings). 11  Anyone who dared to attempt to 
discover the truth was given the cold shoulder, including those who might have 
expected to possess the ‘need to know’. When General Charles Keightley, the allied 
commander-in-chief during the crisis, articulated concerns about operations, ‘Eden 
gave him a severe dressing down and told him that there were questions with which 
military commanders should not concern themselves’.12  
This article examines how details of Eden’s secret accord eventually came to 
light in the following two decades, in the face of considerable opposition from a band 
of officials desperate to keep them, and other sensitive information about the crisis, 
hidden. Drawing on recently declassified records and private papers, it continues and 
critiques an important conversation started in this journal, in 2009, by Peter Beck, in 
                                                        
8 Hansard, The Official Report: House of Commons [hereafter Hansard, Commons], 5th ser., 31 Oct. 1956, vol. 
558, col. 1573; Hansard, Commons, 5th ser., 5 Dec. 1956, vol. 561, cols. 1254–379.  
9 Hansard, Commons,   5th ser., 20 Dec. 1956, vol. 502, col. 1457.  
10 London to State Department, Cable 2322, reproduced in Lucas, Britain and Suez, p. 88. 
11 T. Shaw, Eden, Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez Crisis (London, 1996), p. 
179.  




an article which scrutinised the dogged efforts of backbench Labour MPs to secure a 
Suez inquiry and official history.13  
Several arguments emerge in the analysis. One: while the dark cloud of Suez 
has long been recognised as a climacteric in terms of Britain’s standing in the world, 
hastening the setting of her imperial sun and testing the bonds of US–UK relations, 
scholars have failed to appreciate fully the episode as a milestone in the conduct of 
official secrecy. As we shall see, efforts to ensure that nothing came out placed 
enormous strain on Britain’s legal, bureaucratic and cultural infrastructure of secrecy, 
which was already weakening.  Battles with parliamentary campaigners, historians, 
journalists and politicians-turned-autobiographers would test to the limit the 
mechanisms for controlling the flow of official information that secret-keepers had at 
their disposal, including the Privy Counsellor’s Oath, the Official Secrets Act and the 
Public Records Act, as well as de facto rules and regulations regarding collective 
responsibility and ministerial memoirs. Building on a thought-provoking book chapter 
by Philip Murphy, I suggest that attempts to cover up the discussions at Sèvres put 
particular pressure on what might be seen as the social underpinnings of secrecy in 
Britain. 14  Historically, when confronted with the prospect of an unwelcome 
disclosure, officials had resorted to pulling on gentlemanly heartstrings, in an 
extension of what Peter Hennessy has called the ‘good chaps’ theory of government.15 
The logic here, as David Vincent has also maintained, was that a person who had been 
taught from an early age the importance of loyalty, friendship and fellowship would 
                                                        
13  P.J. Beck, ‘“The Less Said about Suez the Better”: British Government and the Politics of Suez’s 
History, 1956–1967’, English Historical Review, cxxiv (2009), pp. 605–40.   
14 P. Murphy, ‘Telling Tales Out of School: Nutting, Eden and the Attempted Suppression of No End of a 
Lesson’, in S.C. Smith, ed., Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath (Aldershot, 
2008), pp. 195–214.  




self-censor for fear of social exclusion or being labelled a ‘bad chap’.16 However, this 
technique had limited success in suppressing the secrets of Suez: against the backdrop 
of progressive social and cultural change in Britain during the 1960s—which saw the 
increasing rejection of convention and norms and the corresponding growth of a sense 
of rebellion, even among some traditional conservative circles—people followed their 
conscience, not their class.  
Two: the biggest challenge to official secrets about Suez came not from 
backbench socialist firebrands but from front-rank politicians intent on producing 
revelatory memoirs. Senior political elites were extremely difficult to control. No 
government had the nerve to use more draconian methods of regulation against them, 
especially the notorious ‘catch-all’ Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act, which made 
it a criminal offence for a Crown servant to disclosure any classified information 
without lawful authority. The individuals in question realised this and used it to their 
advantage. As the Attorney General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, acknowledged in 1948, it 
would take a brave Prime Minister to authorise the prosecution of a former holder of 
elected office and constitutionally frogmarch them off to court: such a course of 
action was equivalent to using a ‘Naismith hammer to crack a nut’.17 More than 
twenty years later, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Burke Trend, made the same calculation: 
‘Prosecution under the Official Secrets Act, withdrawal of Privy Counsellor status, 
withholding of pension etc … are regarded as so incommensurate with the true 
measure of the technical offence as to make it wholly unrealistic to think of invoking 
them in practice’.18  
The issue of major political figures abusing their position to publish sensitive 
information in memoirs designed, successfully, to boost their pensions had emerged 
                                                        
16 D. Vincent, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain, 1832–1998 (Oxford, 1998).  
17 TNA, LCO 2/3219, Hartley Shawcross, 7 Jan. 1948. 




almost as soon as the Official Secrets Act of 1911 was put on the statute book. During 
his long tenure as Cabinet Secretary from 1916 to 1938, Maurice Hankey discovered 
time and again that the Act was in practice inoperable against senior politicians, with 
Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George in particular proving nigh impossible to 
control.19 The scale of the problem was perhaps best summed up by Hankey’s attempt 
to persuade Lloyd George to remove from his memoirs certain statements about the 
monarchy, to which the ageing war leader replied with characteristic truculence: 
‘Why should the King [George V] be against my book? He can go to Hell. I owe him 
nothing; he owes his throne to me’.20 The post-Suez period represents the critical 
second chapter in this story. Emboldened by the realisation that, in contrast to the 
rank and file, the harshest punishments did not apply to them, the attitude of senior 
memoir-writers who wished to make revelations about the crisis was, at best, 
obstinate and, at worst, pugilistic. Ironically, it was none other than Eden himself who 
showed the least restraint and inflicted the most damage to the crumbling foundations 
of secrecy, bulldozing his way through the rulebook to publish his Suez apologia, Full 
Circle, in 1960. 
Three: to make matters worse for secret-keepers, members of the political 
elite, such as Eden, who wrote books about Suez did so not long after the event. With 
the notable exception of Churchill, who began writing his Second World War 
histories soon after that conflict ended, and who officials viewed as sui generis on 
account of his wartime leadership, political autobiographers had hitherto been fairly 
dilatory in publishing their accounts. This was understood as the gentlemanly thing to 
do, because it ensured that the personalities they described were no longer active in 
                                                        
19 J. Naylor, A Man and an Institution: Sir Maurice Hankey and the Cabinet Secretariat (Cambridge, 1984); G. 
Egerton, ‘The Lloyd George “War Memoirs”: A Study in the Politics of Memory’, Journal of Modern History, 
lx (1988), pp. 55–94.      
20 London, House of Lords Records Office, David Lloyd George Papers, LG/G/212/3, David Lloyd 




government. Moreover, most such works related to the two world wars, where a so-
called ‘vindicator’ clause had given individuals the right and freedom to defend their 
wartime record.21 Suez, however, irrevocably changed the landscape. The crisis left 
such a trail of bruised egos and shattered reputations that some of the key actors felt 
compelled to produce memoirs as soon as possible in their own defence. 
Unsurprisingly, authors found that the financial rewards were greater for more recent 
material, with publishers prepared to pay large sums for books that dealt with subjects 
fresh in the public memory.  
The advent of what Trend called the ‘instant history’ of peacetime events 
represented a major shift in the ecology of political memoirs and caused a myriad of 
problems for the custodians of official secrecy. 22  As they saw it, memoirs that 
elaborated on squabbles with the civil service had the potential to inhibit the free and 
frank exchange of opinions among ministers and officials, who would become wary 
of what they say for fear of disclosure in the near future. They also worried about 
precedent: memoirs packed with references to official documents not available in the 
public domain were likely to prove to be the thin end of the wedge, attracting reprisals 
from journalists and historians denied access to such information under the provisions 
of the Public Records Act. Moreover, recollections of the very recent past were more 
likely to have security and diplomatic implications than accounts published at a 
distance from the events they described. In the case of instant memoirs about Suez, 
there was concern about how disclosures would be perceived in Paris, Tel Aviv, 
Cairo, and, most importantly, in Washington, where diplomatic bridges were being 
rebuilt. In short, concealing collusion was as much a battle over the future as the past.  
                                                        
21 For a more detailed consideration of political memoir-writing before Suez, see D. Reynolds, In Command 
of History: Churchill Writing and Fighting the Second World War (London, 2005); C.R. Moran, Classified: Secrecy 
and the State in Modern Britain (Cambridge, 2013).   








The first and greatest challenge to the secrets of Suez came from Eden himself, with 
his book Full Circle (1960), the first in a trilogy of memoirs. Although there was no 
danger of the former Prime Minister blowing the whistle on collusion, he was 
determined to speak his mind on a range of sensitive issues. Eden had begun to think 
about his memoirs as soon as he left Downing Street on 9 January 1957. With small 
private means and mounting medical bills (stemming from the effects of a botched 
gall bladder operation in 1953, when the slip of a surgeon’s hand had severed his bile 
duct), he needed the money. Indeed, his friends had offered to create a special 
voluntary fund to ease his debts, an act of generosity he refused. 23  Having held 
ministerial office for a quarter of a century and having been witness to Suez and the 
Munich Agreement, the two most divisive political crises of the twentieth century, he 
could command a hefty fee. His friend Brendan Bracken told him that Matthew 
Wellsian, the General Editor of The Times, was prepared to pay £100,000 for the 
world serialisation rights. This, he noted, would enable Eden and his wife Clarissa to 
go on the hunt for property in Somerset—‘a lovely county [with] many delightful 
small houses which are comparatively inexpensive’.24  Lord Beaverbrook, it was said, 
wanted to purchase Eden’s complete literary output, including his private papers, for a 
staggering one million pounds.25  
Money, however, was not the main motivation for going into print. Of greater 
importance to Eden was vindicating his short and ill-starred premiership, and 
                                                        
23 R.R. James, Anthony Eden (London, 1986), p. 602.  
24 Ibid. 




specifically his actions over Suez. According to his biographer David Dutton, he had 
been passionately concerned with his reputation and the verdict of history his whole 
life.26 For a long time, in his own mind at least, his legacy as a ‘Great Briton’ was 
assured. As a staunch opponent of appeasement, who had resigned in protest at 
Neville Chamberlain’s de jure recognition of Italian policy in Abyssinia, he had been 
omitted from the cast list of Cato’s ‘Guilty Men’, the famous indictment of the ‘White 
Paper’ generation.27 Three terms as Foreign Secretary (1935–8; 1940–45; 1951–5) 
had established his status as one of the world’s leading diplomats. Indeed, in 1954, his 
mastery of international affairs was recognised by the queen with a knighthood, a rare 
honour for a serving Foreign Secretary. While his elevation gave rise to forebodings 
in some quarters, when he finally succeeded Churchill and became Prime Minister in 
1955—a position which he had waited to inherit from the aged giant for so long—
political fortune-tellers were generally optimistic about his prospects. Indeed, James 
Margach has gone as far as to say that, ‘By every conceivable test of history, politics 
and popularity, Eden should have been one of Britain’s truly great Prime Ministers’.28 
By the autumn of 1956, everything had changed. After the shortest of political 
honeymoons, his premiership succumbed to drift and decline, with the traditional 
Tory mouthpiece, the Daily Telegraph, famously accusing him of failing to provide 
the ‘smack of firm government’. The growing feeling that he was weak and disposed 
                                                        
26 D. Dutton, Anthony Eden: A Life and a Reputation (London, 1997).   
27 Published in July 1940 by ‘Cato’ (a collective pseudonym for three Beaverbrook journalists, including the 
future Labour Party leader Michael Foot), Guilty Men was a celebrated polemical book that attacked fifteen 
politicians and officials for their failed policies towards Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s. 
28 J. Margach, The Abuse of Power: The War Between Downing Street and the Media, from Lloyd George to Callaghan 
(London, 1978), p. 100. Before he became Prime Minister, concerns about Eden included the view that he 
had more style than substance and, deep down, was a bit of a lightweight—a natural number two. For 
example, taking a jaundiced view, John Grigg wrote of him before the Suez crisis: ‘Popularity means much 
more to him than it ever should mean to a statesman. Since the early days, when he was idolised by 
millions on account of his personal appearance and blameless views, he has never lost the temperament 
and outlook of a prima donna’. With his movie-star good looks and dandyish proclivities—fittingly, he 
lived for a time in a property that was once owned by Beau Brummel—there was no doubting that he 
rubbed some people up the wrong way. See D. Gilmour, ‘Eden and Suez’, London Review of Books, viii, no. 




to dither and scuttle was given further momentum in April 1956 by the so-called 
‘Buster Crabb Affair’, when it emerged that the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) had 
sent a frogman to investigate the hull of a Russian cruiser, wilfully ignoring the order 
of a Prime Minister they regarded as ‘wet’.29 Then came Suez. The crisis, which 
confirmed Britain’s precipitous decline from world power status to that of a second-
class nation, was very much a personal defeat for Eden. Ironically, he had failed at the 
one area of policy where he had shone brightest for over three decades—foreign 
affairs. The critics had a field day. As Dutton has argued, ‘It was precisely because of 
the reputation which Eden enjoyed, and had cultivated, that Suez provided so 
damaging to him’.30  
Following his retirement, the attacks continued and showed no sign of abating. 
The journalist Paul Johnson led the first wave of the literary inquest with The Suez 
War (1957), suggesting that Eden had promoted and practised a policy of violence in 
the Middle East.31 Derived from off-the-record interviews with French sources, Merry 
and Serge Bromberger’s The Secrets of Suez (1957) claimed that Britain, France and 
Israel had acted in concert when they invaded Egypt, and referred to secret meetings, 
arranged by Eden.32 To the dismay of the notoriously thin-skinned former premier, it 
became apparent that Suez threatened to colour assessments of his entire career in 
public life. Randolph Churchill, for example, published a series of hurtful articles in 
the Daily Express claiming that Suez was proof that Eden had lacked the qualities of a 
statesman in the first place and was never fit to fill the shoes of Churchill’s father.33 
                                                        
29 See M.S. Goodman, ‘Covering Up Spying in the “Buster” Crabb Affair: A Note’, International History 
Review, xxx (2008), pp. 768–84; C.R. Moran, ‘Intelligence and the Media: The Buster Crabb Affair, Secrecy 
and the Press’, Intelligence and National Security, xxvi (2011), pp. 676–700.  
30 Dutton, Anthony Eden, p. 100.  
31 P. Johnson, The Suez War (London, 1957).   
32 M. Bromberger and S. Bromberger, The Secrets of Suez (London, 1957).  
33 See Birmingham University Library [hereafter BUL], Anthony Eden [Lord Avon] Papers [hereafter AP], 
33/3/2/128, Alan Hodge to Anthony Eden, 28 Nov. 1958. Randolph Churchill repeated these charges in 




Other accounts focused on his long history of temper tantrums and nerve storms, to 
which his personal staff were routinely subjected, and speculated about whether he 
would have risen to the top had he not been blessed with youthful good looks and 
impeccable fashion sense, which made him conspicuous in the grey world of the 
political establishment.34 D.R. Thorpe has since described these works as suffering 
from ‘syllogistic inevitability’ (that is, the tendency to write a career backwards).35 
In October 1957, fearful of leaving his reputation to ‘history’, Eden formed a 
Literary Trust to administer the publication of three volumes of memoirs. Despite 
personal misgivings about The Times, which had published a series of critical post-
mortems on his premiership, he signed a contract with the newspaper worth 
£160,000—a figure equivalent to £3m today.36 Concerned that he might not live long 
enough to finish—and ‘intent on having its Suez pound of flesh first’37—The Times 
reserved the right to postpone payments until it received chapters relating to his time 
as Prime Minister.38 Since Suez loomed largest in his mind, Eden was happy to follow 
his paymaster’s instructions by writing out of chronological sequence. As Churchill 
had done, he recruited a team of research assistants, including the Oxford historians 
Bryan Cartledge (St Antony’s), Robert Blake (Christ Church) and David Dilks (St 
Antony’s), as well as Alan Hodge, who had worked on Churchill’s History of the 
English-Speaking Peoples.39 Owing to his poor health, the Cabinet Office afforded his 
coadjutors special dispensation to inspect official documents in London on his 
behalf.40 ‘I have had a fierce but agreeable letter from [the Cabinet Secretary] Sir 
Norman Brook’, wrote Hodge, ‘which, under penalty of being sent to the Tower of 
                                                        
34 Dutton, Anthony Eden, p. 6. 
35 Thorpe, Eden, p. 602.  
36 Ibid., p. 533.  
37 Ibid.  
38 TNA, CAB 164/1297, J.M. Moss, ‘Eden Memoirs’, 18 June 1975.  
39 TNA, PREM 11/4600, Norman Brook to Harold Macmillan, ‘Disclosure of Information’, 8 Feb. 1960.  




London for indiscretion, will allow me to consult any papers at Cabinet Office that 
you might wish’.41   
Following the de facto guidelines established by Maurice Hankey, the first 
Cabinet Secretary, in May 1958 Eden began submitting draft chapters to Brook for 
pre-publication review.42 For Brook, the material had a personal resonance. From the 
moment when Egypt’s President, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalised the Suez 
Canal Company on 26 July 1956, he had been at the heart of the government’s 
handling of the crisis, not only keeping the minutes of the Cabinet and of an inner 
Cabinet known as the ‘Egypt Committee’, made up of the Prime Minister and his 
most trusted advisors, but also chairing a Defence (Transition) Committee of 
permanent secretaries which met twenty-nine times during its duration to consider 
Britain’s response to any threat of war.43 As Kevin Theakston has observed, although 
Brook had private reservations about the Suez expedition (later calling it a ‘folly’, and 
remarking ‘I’ve seen a good many cock-ups in my time but I have never seen 
anything like this’),44 such was his devotion to duty that he carried out Eden’s wishes 
without demur, including, after the ceasefire, the destruction of incriminating 
documents.45 Edward Heath later noted in his autobiography that, in performing this 
thankless task, Brook looked ‘like an old Samurai who had just been asked to fall on 
his own sword’.46  
Brook was alarmed by what he read in Eden’s typescript. The general 
presentation of the Suez story was ‘an implied indictment’ (Brook’s words) of 
American foreign policy under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of 
                                                        
41 BUL, AP 33/3/2/32, Hodge to Eden, 28 Nov. 1957.  
42 Naylor, A Man and an Institution, p. 4.   
43 K. Kyle, ‘The Mandarin’s Mandarin: Sir Norman Brook, Secretary of the Cabinet’, Contemporary British 
History, xiii, no. 2 (1999), pp. 64–78, at 66.   
44 Ibid., p. 75.  
45 K. Theakston, Leadership in Whitehall (Basingstoke, 1999), pp. 121–2.   




State, John Foster Dulles.47 Eden reproached the US administration for ‘cynically’ 
undercutting Downing Street’s efforts to undo the nationalisation of the canal by 
economic and diplomatic pressure, leaving him no option but to use force. Dulles, he 
claimed, had ‘strung [Britain] along over many months of negotiation from pretext to 
pretext, from device to device and from contrivance to contrivance’. 48  Dulles’s 
‘game’, he charged, was to prevaricate for political reasons, to ensure that Suez did 
not undermine Eisenhower’s hopes for securing a second term in the November 1956 
presidential election.49  
Eden accused Dulles of giving different messages publicly and privately. In 
public, Dulles had opposed the Anglo-French invasion, castigating it as the worst kind 
of gunboat diplomacy, both imperial and inept.50  Privately, however, Eden’s text 
suggested that the American was a ruthless realist. According to Eden, after 
Eisenhower had refused to prop up the embattled pound without an unconditional 
withdrawal (leading the British to call off the military operation midway, with only 
about half of the Zone secured), Selwyn Lloyd visited Dulles in hospital on 18 
November 1956. Here, showing his Janus-face, Dulles said to Lloyd that he ‘deplored 
that we [Britain] had not managed to bring Nasser down and declared that he must be 
prevented from getting away with it’.51 (The same comments were later repeated to 
Sir Harold Caccia, the British Ambassador to Washington, leaving him ‘so angry that 
literally it required a physical effort not to leap up and swarm over the desk’.)52 Part 
                                                        
47 TNA, PREM 11/4234, Norman Brook, ‘Comments on Books II and III of Volume II: The Period of 
the Premiership’, 20 July 1959.  
48 TNA, CAB 164/1297, J.M. Moss, ‘Eden Memoirs’, 18 June 1975. 
49 For a penetrating analysis of Eden’s relationship with Dulles and the latter’s alleged duplicity, see Wm. R. 
Louis, ‘Dulles, Suez, and the British’, in R. Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War 
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50 D. Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain, and the International Order since the Second 
World War’, International Affairs, lxii (1985–6), pp. 1–20, at 9.  
51 C. Roberts, ‘Suez in Retrospect: Anthony Eden’s Memoirs’, The Atlantic (Apr. 1960).  
52 Princeton University, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, 




of a romantic, Churchillian generation of Englishmen who took the Special 
Relationship as in the natural order of things, Brook questioned the wisdom of 
including these ‘pretty sharp’ observations, suggesting that they might ‘give rise to 
quite a lot of difficulty’, especially as both Eisenhower and Dulles were still in 
office.53 Eden swiftly and sternly replied that he had been ‘very restrained’ in his 
treatment of the Americans, remarking that ‘there is certainly much more that I could 






On 24 June 1959, Brook received the full typescript of Full Circle, prompting him to 
send copies to key stakeholders for comment. The feedback had a common theme: 
Eden had been far too vituperative about the Americans. Lord Salisbury, the former 
Lord President, worried about the ‘pretty outspoken criticism of Dulles’, especially 
since the legendary Secretary of State had recently passed away, on 24 May, and was 
generally held in high esteem at the time of his death.55 Sir Philip de Zulueta—private 
secretary to Harold Macmillan, Eden’s successor from January 1957—wrote a note 
confirming that the Prime Minister was deeply concerned about the text from the 
perspective of Anglo-American relations. Since becoming premier, he had set great 
store by healing the wounds that Suez had made in relations with the White House. 
As David Reynolds has shown, within just a short time he had made considerable 
progress, aided by the fact that he and Eisenhower were old wartime buddies, having 
                                                        
53 TNA, CAB 164/1297, J.M. Moss, ‘Eden Memoirs’, 18 June 1975.  
54 Ibid.  




worked together in North Africa and Italy in 1943–4.56 In March 1957, the two had 
met at the Bermuda conference, and Macmillan had agreed to the deployment of sixty 
Thor missiles in Britain, in return for a US commitment to engineer greater British 
access to American secrets about nuclear weapons. Reportedly, ‘the two elderly 
gentleman relished their reunion, wandering in and out of each other’s rooms in their 
pyjamas, chatting old times and new’. 57  By May 1959, fearing a ‘missile gap’ 
following the Soviet launch of Sputnik, the President had signed agreements with 
Britain permitting a greater exchange of information, technology and fissile 
materials.58 Clearly, Macmillan did not want Eden’s memoir to endanger this renewed 
rapport. It was essential ‘not to unduly wound our friends’, emphasised de Zulueta, 
‘and I think the American people are our friends and the American administration are 
more co-operative than they were in their more ignorant days’.59 Controversially, the 
typescript suggested that Macmillan, as Chancellor during the crisis, had been a 
leading hawk in the Egypt Committee, opposed to taking the ‘Nasser problem’ to the 
United Nations for mediation, and relentlessly calling for military action irrespective 
of attitudes in Washington.  
Selwyn Lloyd compiled a lengthy list of grievances, prefaced with the 
important rider ‘to be shown to no-one except, at Brook’s discretion, the Prime 
Minister’.60 As Foreign Secretary, Lloyd was nervous about the possible damage to 
Britain’s overseas equities. As well as deploring the book’s ‘strong anti-American 
bias’, which might put at risk Macmillan’s attempts to mend fences with Washington, 
he feared that the manuscript’s ‘rather crude’ partisanship of the Israelis against the 
Egyptians and other important Arab constituencies might damage ‘efforts to improve 
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our relations in that part of the world’.61 Specifically, he was anxious about the claim 
that the ‘Israeli–Egyptian explosion was advantageous to the free world’; this, he 
speculated, might increase the suspicion that Eden had inspired the crisis and that 
there had been foreknowledge of the Israeli attack of 29 October.62 
Lloyd complained that 1960, the date scheduled for publication, was simply 
too soon. Many of the people quoted in the book, whether in government, opposition, 
or in other countries, were still active in politics and would probably be upset by the 
premature disclosure of what they had entrusted to Eden in confidence. For example, 
there were descriptions of private meetings between Eden and the Shah of Iran, in 
which the latter spoke negatively about Nasser. Although the Shah would not 
repudiate his hatred of the Egyptian president, to be quoted to this effect in an official 
memoir might cause him embarrassment. There were also unflattering 
characterisations of General Charles De Gaulle, who, having watched Suez from the 
political sidelines, was now back at the helm as French prime minister and more 
distrustful than ever of perfidious Albion. ‘The difficulty about all this’, Lloyd 
remarked, ‘is that had Sir Anthony’s book appeared in 1970 or even in 1965 there 
could not have been any possible objection … If a statesman chooses to publish his 
memoirs very soon after the events to which they refer, I think it means he has to 
accept they will be more jejune than otherwise’.63 In closing, he commented that he 
had hoped for a ‘broadminded, tolerant, statesmanlike’ account, which would ‘stand 
the test of history and befit Eden’s great reputation’.64 However, the book gave the 
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impression of a cantankerous old man, resentful of criticism and full of malice. ‘To 
publish in present form would be a personal mistake’, he warned.65  
Interestingly, while officials panicked about what the memoir had revealed, 
some of Eden’s closest friends and aides were more concerned about what it had not 
revealed. Lord Chandos (Oliver Lyttelton, the former Conservative Secretary of State 
for the Colonies) questioned whether collusion was not already an open secret and 
wondered, therefore, whether ‘complete silence may tend to provoke more 
controversy than if you were able to put in something which headed them off’.66 After 
all, many people had seen the Suez invasion as a hysterical over-reaction and had 
never taken Eden at face value when, drawing analogies with Hitler and Mussolini, 
and equating the nationalisation of the Canal with the remilitarisation of the 
Rhineland or the annexation of the Sudetenland, he had argued that Nasser was a 
modern-day dictator incapable of responding to a policy of appeasement. Confident 
that the inner Cabinet would take the secret to their graves, Eden cagily replied: ‘As 
regards the other charge against us, after much reflection I thought a detached account 
of events without protestation was the best way to handle the business’.67  
Robert Blake, one of Eden’s research associates, identified three ‘mysterious’ 
omissions.68 First, the exact motive for Anglo-French intervention had not been fully 
expounded. Although Eden had claimed that the ambition had been to prevent war 
from spreading across the Middle East and to safeguard free passage through the 
canal, he had disclosed neither when the Cabinet had reached this decision, nor when 
or where the concerting of a joint policy with the French had been arranged. Like 
Chandos, in view of all the allegations about collusion, Blake urged Eden to deal with 
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the matter ‘quite specifically’, to avert ‘skeptical and incredulous’ public reaction.69 It 
is fascinating to note from reading the letters of Eden’s research assistants that the 
former premier had clearly not entrusted them with the truth. In one communication, 
Blake ridiculed the ‘Left’ for suggesting that there had been ‘some mysterious and 
sinister plans with French ministers’, using exclamation marks to underscore just how 
absurd he believed this allegation to be.70 In another, he scoffed at the accusations of 
‘left-wing intellectual moralists’. 71  Elsewhere, he remarked that he had ‘heard 
something about our extreme secrecy’, and asked Eden to explain why he had once 
said to him that the Israeli attack ‘did not come as a complete surprise’.72 Meanwhile, 
Alan Hodge delighted in attacking Randolph Churchill’s ‘conjectural rubbish’, 
‘squibs’, ‘misconceptions and half-truths’ about collusion.73  For Eden not to have 
confided in his assistants adds weight to Philip Murphy’s argument that from the 
point of view of the chief British conspirator, collusion was as much a ‘private secret’ 
as an official one.74 Blake and Hodge, we should not forget, had been given the 
official ‘need to know’ by the Cabinet Office, allowing them to work in classified 
state archives. What they were evidently not given, by Eden, was the need to know 
everything. 
Blake’s second problem was that Britain’s reasons for withdrawal had not 
been adequately explained. In his view, it was hard to believe that Britain pulled out, 
as Eden claimed, when the fighting stopped between Egypt and Israel. Although she 
had achieved her announced intention of ‘separating the combatants’, surely she had 
also hoped to resolve the canal question, dethrone Nasser and return Egypt to 
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European hegemony? ‘The ordinary man in the street’, he suggested, recognised that 
‘Nasser needed taking down a peg or two and bringing to his senses’. Thus, he would 
want to know ‘why we did not finish the job, occupy the whole canal, clear it with our 
own salvage fleet, and then negotiate a settlement with Nasser, or his successor’.75  
Blake’s final concern was that the military side of Suez had been ignored. 
Notably, Eden had said nothing about the alleged disagreements between British and 
French forces over how to stage the intervention. For example, it had been reported 
that the French had preferred a ‘lightning action’ with forty-eight hours of bombing 
followed by parachute descents, whereas the British favoured a slow and sustained 
aerial bombardment. Overall, Blake advised that since ‘the book will be very largely 
judged by the Suez chapters … it is, therefore, of paramount importance to make 
these chapters as clear, candid and readable as possible’. ‘It is absolutely vital’, he 
continued, ‘to answer the questions still left in people’s minds, and not to give any 
impression, however unwitting, of evading problems or suppressing facts’.76   
Eden doggedly resisted all attempts to tell him what he should and should not 
include. He told Brook that he resented ‘the coldness in the tone of the official 
comments’, and made it clear that this was his memoir—‘his apologia’—and that he 
was entitled to ruffle a few feathers.77 Much to the chagrin of the Cabinet Secretary, 
the attack on the US was left largely intact, including the hatchet job on Dulles, who 
was the unmistakable bête noire of the work. ‘We have failed to tone down the 
criticism of US policy’, Brook lamented: ‘The tone of the book remains sharply 
critical of the US administration, which may provoke hostile American reactions’.78  
Eden referred to Dulles as a ‘preacher in a world of politics’ who had ‘little regard for 
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the consequences of his words’. 79  Responding to the late Secretary of State’s 
pronouncements that Suez had been colonialism masquerading as international law 
enforcement, Eden remarked—touché—that ‘if the United States had to defend their 
treaty rights in the Panama Canal, they would not regard such action as 
colonialism’.80 Elsewhere, he asserted that Dulles’s ‘cynicism towards Allies destroys 
true partnership. It leaves only the choice of parting or a master and vassal 
relationship in foreign policy’.81 
By early November 1959, Brook informed Macmillan that ‘we really have no 
alternative but to put up with the book as it now stands’.82 In a tacit acknowledgment 
that Eden was above the law, he added that ‘our difficulty arises from the fact that the 
control we can exercise over anyone in Sir Anthony’s position cannot be more than 
persuasion’—shorthand for a combination of polite arm-twisting and quid pro quo 
arrangements.83 Using the Official Secrets Act was out of the question, as it had been 
in the cases of Lloyd George and Churchill in the 1930s, and then again after 1945 
with Churchill and other distinguished members of the War Cabinet such as Clement 
Attlee (Deputy Prime Minister) and Viscount Halifax (Foreign Secretary).84 
In a final bid to secure changes to the text, Brook asked Macmillan to write a 
letter to Eden—‘more in sorrow than in anger’—insinuating that the book was 
beneath him.85 The idea was that Macmillan would approach Eden not so much as 
Prime Minister, but as one Old Etonian to another, concerned about gentlemanly 
conduct. The tactic of couching censorship in the form of a gentlemanly request had 
been used with Churchill, albeit with limited effect, the one notable success being to 
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convince him to edit out from his memoirs the subject of codebreaking at Bletchley 
Park.86 Macmillan decided against this, uncomfortable with ‘upsetting Eden’ who, 
mindful of the need to avoid giving ammunition to the Labour Party, had at least 
shown the good grace to defer the release of the book until after the October 1959 
general election. 87  Instead, Macmillan focused his attention on dealing with the 
possible fallout from publication. On 5 January 1960, a week before serialisation, he 
sent a secret telegram to Eisenhower apologising in advance if the book ‘revived 
some of the old controversies’.88 It was explained that Her Majesty’s Government had 
suggested a large number of alterations, especially in relation to comments about US 
policy, but ultimate responsibility rested with the author. Macmillan paid tribute to 
the Bermuda conference as evidence of the renewed transatlantic alliance and 
underlined that he was ‘anxious that our two Governments should not become 
involved in any recriminations about the past’.89 In closing, he stressed that he ‘would 
much have preferred the memoirs to remain unpublished, for some time to come’, 
before opining: ‘My own feeling is that we should leave history to the historians—
you and I have quite enough trouble with the present and the future without going 
back over the past’.90 With the benefit of hindsight, it is hard not to see the irony in 
this last remark, for in his retirement Macmillan had no intention of leaving history to 
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In January 1960, then, Eden steered political memoir-writing into uncharted waters: 
never before had a statesman of the first rank published an account of a recent 
peacetime event in which he himself had played such a key part. Commercially, Full 
Circle was a great success, topping the bestseller list and shifting 77,000 copies in just 
nine months.91 The Times reported that its circulation increased by 15 per cent during 
the weeks of serialisation—a ‘very remarkable jump’ for a newspaper with usually 
very stable sales figures.92  
Privately, officials anxiously waited to see if their concerns about the book 
had been justified, especially with regard to foreign relations and the potential for 
upsetting people in positions of power. The early signs were positive. Guy Mollet, the 
French prime minister at the time of Suez, told Eden that ‘I appreciated and approved 
the discretion with which you touch on certain aspects of the problem’, almost 
certainly a reference to the continued silence about collusion.93 Pleasingly, Winston 
Churchill reported that he found the references to him ‘fair’ and ‘honourable to his 
name’.94 To everyone’s relief, there was little evidence of backlash from American 
allies. On 10 February—twenty-four hours after Lewis Silkin, a Labour peer, had 
asked in the House of Lords what ‘mischief’ the book had caused across the 
Atlantic95—Number 10 received a pleasant message from the White House explaining 
that the ‘general reaction was mild’ and that administration insiders regarded Suez as 
nothing more than ‘an ill-advised adventure’, long since forgotten.96 The volume of 
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media coverage, it reported, had been ‘relatively small’—in part a reflection of the 
fact that ‘there was a great deal of other news competing for comment’, including the 
unfolding presidential election race between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy, but 
also because, in American eyes, the ‘episode had undoubtedly dropped further back in 
the national consciousness than was the case in the UK’.97 In Britain, against the 
backdrop of decolonisation and the final years of empire, Suez clearly still resonated: 
indeed, many now interpreted it as the last throw of the imperial dice. In the United 
States, by contrast, as the renowned scholar Martin Wight wrote in the journal 
International Affairs, ‘Already the Suez expedition seems remote and rounded-off, a 
failure of high drama but small historical effect, less consequential internationally 
than the Mexican expedition by Napoleon III, less consequential domestically than 
the failure to relieve Gordon at Khartoum’.98 
As Blake had warned would happen, Eden was heavily criticised, in the UK at 
least, for a perceived lack of candidness about vital elements of the Suez story. 
Nettled by Eden’s continued denial of collusion and his insistence that Israeli 
operations were wholly independent of Britain and France, Hugh Gaitskell, the leader 
of the Labour Party, called the book ‘exceptionally misleading’. 99  In the New 
Statesman, Paul Johnson wrote that, despite being given the full run of the state 
archives, Eden could ‘make no better case for Suez than such journalists as John 
Connell and T.E. Utley’. 100  The claim that there had been total unity in the 
government was plainly dishonest, since the book conveniently failed to mention the 
resignations of Sir Edward Boyle, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, and 
Anthony Nutting, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in protest at the invasion, 
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still less the latter’s remarkable self-abnegation in refusing to criticise his chief 
publicly. The notion that during the crisis ‘Not a mouse moved in Arab lands’ was 
also pure dissimulation, with the book ignoring the facts that Saudi Arabia had broken 
off diplomatic relations and that Iraq had tabled a motion for Britain’s expulsion from 
the defence alliance, the Baghdad Pact. ‘In narrating episodes’, Johnson asserted, 
‘Eden has been less than frank. His colleagues certainly know it, and he must know 
that they know it’.101 
Eden’s longtime nemesis Randolph Churchill predictably stuck the knife in. 
Also writing in the New Statesman, he declared that Eden ‘adds little to what is 
already known, and in many issues on which his policy has been questioned or 
criticised, he makes no attempt to find an answer’.102 According to Churchill, no one 
would believe Eden’s argument that British intervention, though cancelled after 
thirty-six hours, was successful because it led to the creation of an international peace 
force in the region, under the auspices of the United Nations. This, he suggested, was 
‘certainly a small and fugitive dividend to achieve at such enormous cost and with 
such high risk’. 103   In common with several reviewers, he pointed out the 
inconsistency between Eden’s explanation of the original intention of the Suez 
operation as being to bring Nasser to heel and prevent another Munich, and his 
justification of the operation itself as an unbiased police intervention to preserve the 
peace.104 This, to Churchill, was ‘disingenuous’, ‘unconvincing’ and ‘makes pathetic 
reading’.105   
Since it was obvious that Eden had enjoyed privileged access to closed official 
documents in the compilation of Full Circle, many reviewers called for the immediate 
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overhaul of the Public Records Act, which had only come in to force on 1 January 
1959, establishing a statutory fifty-year rule for the closure of all government records. 
In the correspondence column of The Times, which had a reputation for staging fiery 
exchanges between campaigning academics and Whitehall mandarins,106 the historian 
A.J.P. Taylor protested that researchers would have to wait until the next century to 
discover how partisan, if at all, Eden had been. 107  Among the dangers of such 
favouritism was that, by skilful selection of records, ex-ministers could claim almost 
anything, safe in the knowledge that outside authentication could not happen for 
decades.108  Tristan Jones, the General Manager of the Observer, complained that 
there was ‘one law for the high and mighty and another law for ordinary mortals’. 
‘The high and mighty’, he protested, ‘are enabled to put out their version of events 
and prevent other people, who may have other evidence, from challenging them’.109  
Officials were acutely aware that Full Circle left them a hostage to fortune. 
On the eve of publication, Brook predicted that the book would deepen the bad blood 
between the favoured few and the disqualified historical community, as well as 
embolden future memoirists to demand similar privileges. Accordingly, he 
emphasised the ‘need to look at the rules’ regarding access by ex-ministers to papers 
covered by the fifty-year rule.110 This had to be done urgently, since there was an 
increasing public appetite for political memoirs in preference to revelations ‘by the 
soldiers’.111 As he saw it, a key part of the problem was that ministers had been given 
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too much freedom to retain official papers when they retired. 112  To bypass the 
guidelines pertaining to Crown copyright and the custody of official material, Eden, 
copying Churchill, had taken the precaution throughout his career of instructing his 
staff to stamp letters, telegrams and minutes as ‘Private’ or ‘Personal’. As a result, he 
had amassed a large private collection of sensitive documents; indeed, like Churchill, 
he had needed horseboxes to transport them on the day he left Downing Street.  
Macmillan agreed that a tough line had to be taken on the ownership of, and 
access to, official documents. In 1963 he approved the idea of Burke Trend, Brook’s 
successor as Cabinet Secretary, of prohibiting research assistants from working on 
behalf of ex-ministers in secret archives.113 With reminiscences on the horizon by 
Lord Mountbatten and Viscount Kilmuir (both of whom had occupied arterial 
positions in 1956 as First Sea Lord and Lord Chancellor respectively), he also 
introduced the so-called ‘Suez Embargo’, which ruled that nobody was allowed to 
consult records relating to the crisis without the express permission of the Prime 
Minister.  Initially, this stopped the bleeding. Mountbatten lost the urge to write, while 
Kilmuir produced an ‘unexceptionable’ book,114 revealing (in the words of the new 
Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home) ‘nothing more than all of us said in Parliament 
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At the time of Suez, Gaitskell boldly predicted that, sooner or later, the people who 
had been privy to collusion ‘are bound to start giving one another away’.116 It took 
less than a decade for him to be proved right. The first person to break the bond of 
secrecy was the former French foreign minister, Christian Pineau. In May 1964, 
during a television interview promoting his new book Dulles over Suez, Herman 
Finer, a political scientist, held up a letter he had received from Pineau in March of 
the previous year. In it, remarkably, the Frenchman wrote that in October 1956 he and 
Mollet had travelled incognito to Paris to reach an agreement with the Israelis and the 
British on joint intervention.117 Despite this being the first time that collusion had 
been acknowledged by one of the main protagonists, surprisingly, the letter failed to 
make much of an impact. In the House, Labour backbencher Emrys Hughes asked 
whether an official history of Suez should be commissioned, suggesting that ‘students 
at Eton and Oxford are greatly handicapped’ by the absence of such an account.118 
But Douglas-Home easily swatted away the question, responding that since the 
official history programme dealt with major conflicts of arms, there was no case for 
one on Suez.  
Two years later, with the tenth anniversary of Suez provoking renewed press 
interest in the subject, Pineau added further pieces to the collusion jigsaw puzzle, this 
time with greater consequences. In July, in plain defiance of the assurances he had 
given a decade earlier, he confirmed to the BBC Third Programme that an ‘Anglo-
French–Israeli Treaty’ had been signed before the invasion and added that, ‘if one day 
my English friends of this period accept to say the truth about this, I should agree’.119 
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In November—believing that ‘for the French, the operation was now old history and 
devoid of current political content’—he went even further, publishing an article in Le 
Monde in which he disclosed that a secret accord had been signed, at Sèvres, in the 
‘last ten days of October 1956’.120 In view of these revelations, the Prime Minister, 
Harold Wilson, faced calls from Labour backbenchers, led by Michael Foot, to 
commission an official Suez inquiry, analogous to the Dardanelles Commission of 
1916 on the disastrous Gallipoli campaign. Attracted by the prospect of poking the 
Conservative Party in the eye, Wilson was initially open to the idea. ‘Far from British 
intervention being to separate the Egyptian and Israeli forces, as we were told, the 
whole thing was a put-up job’, he raged in parliament.121 By the end of the year, 
however, the matter had been quietly dropped. Behind closed doors, senior civil 
servants including Trend and Paul Gore-Booth, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, had persuaded Wilson that an inquiry could backfire, not least 
politically. The public, they cautioned, might regard it as a vindictive diversion of 
time and effort from the government’s domestic agenda. Moreover, there was the risk 
that two parties could play the game of exposure. Traditionally, governments had 
been reluctant to investigate their predecessors’ scandals, knowing that they too had 
secrets to hide and that the tables could soon turn once they were back in 
opposition.122 According to Trend, the constitutional implications of abandoning this 
practice were ‘grave and far-reaching’.123 Wilson was also warned that an inquiry 
could rouse ‘very violent international passions’, especially if the prima facie 
evidence of collusion was officially acknowledged. In Israel, for example, to show 
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strength to the Arab world, politicians had projected the image of a dashing military 
success; candour about foreign assistance would detract from this.  
By 1967, the broad brushstrokes of the events surrounding the Sèvres Protocol 
could be found in a large body of literature. Notable works included Le Piège de Suez 
by Henri Azeua; Suez Ultra Secret by Michael Bar-Zohar, the official biographer of 
Ben-Gurion; Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Crisis by Terence Robertson, which 
had been written with the support of Lester Pearson, Canada’s Foreign Minister at the 
time of Suez; Diary of the Sinai Campaign by General Moshe Dayan; The Suez Affair 
by Hugh Thomas; and Suez: Ten Years On by Peter Calvocoressi, which was 
accompanied by a BBC TV series that the Ministry of Defence had wanted to ban.124 
1967 proved to be a key year, since it also saw the first public confirmation of 
collusion by a British politician, in a book called No End of a Lesson by Anthony 
Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from 1954–6. 
Before Suez, Nutting had been a rising star of the Conservative Party, 
seemingly destined for the highest offices of state. Handsome, stylish, and mentored 
by Eden himself, to whom he was indebted for his swift political rise and with whom 
he shared many mannerisms, gestures and idioms of speech (to the extent that 
cartoonists depicted him as ‘Eden’s Eden’), Nutting was widely regarded during 
Churchill’s second premiership as the heir presumptive to Eden, the acknowledged 
heir apparent.125 The protégé, however, would become one of the great ‘casualties’ of 
Suez. On 31 October 1956, two weeks after first learning of the secret plot to invade 
Egypt, and with British planes in the air, Nutting resigned from office. Despite being 
urged to stay by Macmillan, who promised ‘you will lead the party one day’, he was 
uncomfortable with having to tell lies to defend what he considered ‘a sordid 
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manoeuvre … morally indefensible and politically suicidal’.126 Mindful of breaking 
the Official Secrets Act with military operations ongoing, and loyal to his Privy 
Counsellor’s Oath (the centuries-old confidentiality pact in which members pledge to 
‘keep secret all matters committed and revealed unto you or that shall be treated 
secretly in council’), he did not divulge his reasons for leaving. Indeed, he did not 
even give a resignation speech in the House of Commons, as was customary. For his 
silence, he paid a heavy personal price. His unexplained action caused such 
bewilderment among his constituents that he was forced to give up his safe seat in 
Melton, while many Tories, in the grip of imperial war fever, regarded him as a 
traitor. Feeling betrayed by someone he had taken to his bosom, Eden spread the 
malicious rumour that Nutting had wanted to extricate himself from government 
before details of a messy divorce hit the headlines.127 Overnight, aged only 36, the 
‘second golden boy’ became a political outcast. Later, he recalled that he was 
suddenly ‘bereft of friends, a castaway adrift on a sea of anger and recrimination, an 
object of distrust, torn between loyalty to principle and loyalty to friends and 
associates’.128 In a phrase that is testament to the tribal world of Conservative politics, 
Selwyn Lloyd cynically dismissed his estrangement as a case of ‘Much Ado About 
Nutting’.129 
Despite the injustice of his fall from favour, and despite ultimately being 
proved right in all his forebodings, Nutting remained tight-lipped about the secrets of 
collusion. He took the view that ‘as long as any of the chief protagonists of the Suez 
war still held high office in Britain, it would clearly have been a grave disservice to 
the nation, which they still led and represented in the councils of the world, to have 
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told the whole story’.130 Indeed, it is tempting to view him as the only participant in 
the affair who took seriously the professed values of honourable conduct. By January 
1966, however, with so much being written, and with Britain in the grip of profound 
social and cultural change that was loosening traditional mores, he had concluded that 
it was finally time to tell his side of the story. After ten years, he told Trend, it was 
‘pardonable … that I should answer charges of betraying my leader and patron’.131 In 
his defence, he explained that ‘none of those responsible hold office’; he also 
suggested that it was ‘only fair’ that he publish while those involved were still alive, 
to allow them to respond.  
With the book still to be written, Trend’s immediate concern was whether or 
not to inform the Labour government. On the one hand, as the matter concerned the 
actions of a previous Tory administration, ‘it was in a sense nothing to do with 
them’.132 Moreover, with a general election scheduled for 31 March, Trend was loath 
to gift them a ‘kind of minor Zinoviev letter’ with which to sucker-punch their 
Conservative opponents.133 On the other hand, a book that came clean about collusion 
had the potential to affect British foreign relations, something that the government of 
the day had a right to know. Confident that Nutting could yet be persuaded to 
abandon the project, and in a classic example of the mandarin logic that the ‘need to 
know’ should be the preserve of those who know best, Trend decided against bringing 
ministers into the loop at this stage.  
Trend’s optimism stemmed from his lingering faith in what David Vincent has 
referred to as the gentleman’s code of ‘instinctive self-censorship’.134 The youngest 
son of a wealthy landowner, educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, where 
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he studied agriculture and owned a pack of hounds, Nutting was a gentleman 
personified.135 In the political wilderness, he enjoyed companionship with another 
upper-class Tory exile, the disgraced Secretary of State for War John Profumo, who 
accompanied him on salmon-fishing trips near his Sutherland farm in Scotland.136 
Keen to exploit these deep-rooted allegiances, Trend met with Nutting and lectured 
him on the need to meet certain social obligations, claiming that, irrespective of what 
had happened to him personally, he owed a ‘certain loyalty to his then political 
chiefs’. 137  On Trend’s instructions, Macmillan pursued a similar line of attack, 
suggesting to his fellow Old Etonian that ‘spicy revelations about Suez’ were 
unseemly for a person of ‘dignified’ stock.138  Like a naughty schoolboy, Nutting 
effectively found himself ‘on the bill’, having to explain his misbehaviour to a steely 
headmaster who brooked no dissent. As hard they tried, however, neither Trend nor 
Macmillan could convince him not to write the book, although he did promise to 
‘show the manuscript up to someone’ (a ‘school-ism’ for handing it to a superior 
authority, like a form master).139 Defeat in the March general election, when Nutting 
unsuccessfully contested the seat of East Oldham, ended any lingering hope of a 
return to politics and instilled a sense of there being nothing more to lose. Moreover, 
he was emboldened by Wilson’s comment in parliament that someone from the 
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Trend received the proofs of Nutting’s book on 3 April 1967 and immediately sent 
copies around the Whitehall village for vetting, as well as notifying Eden and Number 
10. Time was of the essence since newspaper serialisation was scheduled to start later 
in the month, a deliberate ploy by Nutting to limit the opportunity for protracted or 
arbitrary decision-making by the official machine. The text itself was a bombshell, 
revealing intimate details of the meeting at Sèvres, as well as the secret manoeuvres 
that had led up to it. It disclosed, for example, that Nutting had been present at 
Chequers, the Prime Minister’s country residence, on 14 October 1956, when a 
French delegation had presented Eden with ‘The Plan’ that Israel would attack Egypt 
across the Sinai Peninsula, after which the French and the British would intervene on 
the pretext of ‘extinguishing a dangerous fire’.141 Given his pathological hatred of 
Nasser, recollected Nutting, Eden ‘could scarcely contain his glee’, before telling Guy 
Millard (the Duty Secretary) ‘There’s no need to take notes’.142  
The Foreign Office had a litany of concerns. From the perspective of 
‘Britain’s probity and good repute as an ally, actual or potential, and a partner in 
international relations’, they considered the book ‘objectionable’ and ‘damaging’.143  
As key officials saw it, confirmation of collusion could not but adversely reflect upon 
the methods by which Britain was perceived to practise diplomacy, and would 
potentially invite the accusation that there had been a breach of international 
peremptory norms (jus cogens). Naturally, there was anxiety about how the 
revelations would be seen in the Middle East. While recognising that collusion was 
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widely assumed throughout the region, it was feared that further evidence of British 
meddling would create a ‘moral bank credit’ for Nasser, which he would exploit to 
propagate his vision of pan-Arab unity and win the allegiance of the West’s closest 
Arab friend, Saudi Arabia.144 An additional concern was that a reminder of British–
Israeli duplicity in 1956 might be interpreted by Arab nations, with whom Her 
Majesty’s Government had to deal, that the British political system was 
fundamentally Zionist and supportive of a Jewish national state in Palestine.145  
Unsurprisingly, Eden was horrified. No foreknowledge, no prior agreement: 
that had been his position in 1956, reiterated in Full Circle, and again in the years 
since. ‘How can he [Nutting] get away with this’, he wrote despairingly.146 On 14 
April, he sent Trend a dog-eared copy of the proofs, the marginalia filled with 
comments such as ‘This is not true’, ‘This is not accurate’, ‘I do not recall’, ‘I 
remember no talk’, ‘I have no recollection of this’, ‘This is nonsense’, ‘I never said 
that’, ‘No such phrase was ever used’, and ‘There was never any such 
conversation’.147 Particularly upsetting to him was the clear implication in the book 
that he had been ‘eager for hostilities with the Egyptian dictator’, constantly ‘putting 
strong pressure on the Foreign Secretary to favour warlike courses’. 148 ‘The charge of 
dictatorship on my part can only be described as hysterical’, he fumed in a letter to the 
now-retired Norman Brook, adding that ‘No member of Cabinet would endorse it for 
a second’.149 Reading between the lines of his correspondence—abounding with terms 
such as ‘inexcusable’ and ‘gross breach’—it is clear that he regarded the disclosures 
as more than just a professional matter. In his estimation, Nutting had broken one of 
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the unspoken rules of a gentleman: do not squeal on your friends, much as you would 
not wear a hat indoors, steal the quarry felled by another man’s bullet, or, unless you 
were a member of the Eton Society (a ‘popper’), sit on the wall on the Long Walk. 
Put another way, while he might have expected to be slighted by someone like 
Michael Foot, with his unruly shock of white hair and scruffy jackets, he expected 
much better of Nutting.   
Wilson had no problem with Nutting heaping further obloquy on Eden 
himself. Moreover, unlike the Foreign Office, he was ‘rather less worried’ about the 
consequences for international relations, suggesting that ‘Nasser is hardly likely to be 
more intransigent (even if he were capable of it)’ and might even be ‘thankful for the 
small mercy of having a non-Suez government in Great Britain’.150 Given that the 
content of the book was, in his words, ‘highly favourable to the government’, one 
might have assumed, therefore, that he was rubbing his hands with glee. However, 
that was not the case. Any short-term party political gains, he stressed in a letter to 
Trend, would be ‘bought at a heavy price in terms of the general conduct of public 
life’.151 Specifically, he worried about precedent. Like Eden with Full Circle, Nutting 
had ventured into the realm of ‘instant history’, excusing himself on the grounds of a 
self-devised ‘10 year rule’. By allowing books of this nature to be published, Wilson 
feared, the floodgates would be opened for ‘someone even more unscrupulous, and 
more speedy with his pen, than Nutting’. 152  Fresh in the memory was the 
embarrassment caused by Christopher Mayhew. In February 1966, Mayhew had 
resigned as Navy Minister in protest at the Government’s decision to slash defence 
spending, most notably with the cancellation of the CVA-01 aircraft carrier, but still 
to maintain British strategic commitments east of Suez. No sooner had he left office 
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than he penned a book, Britain’s Role Tomorrow, criticising Wilson’s defence 
policy.153 ‘If this had been written by one of my subordinates during my Army days 
the writer would by now have been back in his barracks’, remarked the Paymaster-
General, George Wigg, summing up the mood of ministers. 154 In making calculations 
about Nutting, Wilson was doubtless thinking about Richard Crossman, the Leader of 
the House, a compulsive diary-keeper and likely future chronicler of the Cabinet. 
Tellingly, in Wilson’s letter to Trend, next to the word ‘unscrupulous’, the Foreign 
Secretary, George Brown, had scribbled ‘Crossman in mind?’155 
Wilson and his advisers agonised over what should be done. One option was 
to intimidate Nutting with the possibility of prosecution under the Official Secrets 
Act, an approach endorsed by Eden, who argued that the ‘more outrageous [the 
response], the better’.156 Wilson was loath to do this. First, as we have seen, the 
Official Secrets Act was a ‘brittle deterrent’ against the senior political class; Nutting 
would not seriously believe that Her Majesty’s Government would invoke the law 
against an ex-minister such as himself.157 And secondly, if it became known that 
Nutting had been threatened with the Act in order to suppress vital information about 
Suez (‘the publishers would hardly keep it secret’), there would be renewed public 
pressure for an official enquiry into the whole affair. Moreover, Wilson’s enemies in 
the press would delight in characterising him ‘in a 1984 capacity’.158 Another option 
was to threaten Nutting with the withdrawal of his Privy Counsellor status by the 
queen—a solution favoured by Trend, who considered the book, in its current form, a 
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‘flagrant’ breach of the Oath and therefore an ‘insult to the Crown’. 159  Again, 
however, for fear of being cast as an enemy of free speech, Wilson was reluctant to 
sanction any remedy that smacked of being heavy-handed. Furthermore, with his own 
memoir to write one day, self-interestedly he was nervous about the ‘inhibiting effect’ 
a harsh response would have on future autobiographers, lamenting that it ‘might have 
the effect of ruling out memoirs such as those of Churchill, Attlee and others, while 
allowing the Mayhew stuff to get through’.160  
Nervous about the Labour Government acting unilaterally against Nutting—
especially if a tough stance was taken and a row ensued—Wilson consulted Edward 
Heath, the leader of the Tory Opposition. Heath, who shared the anxiety about 
aggrieved former ministers establishing their own ten-, five-, or even one-year rules, 
suggested that, rather than trying to ban publication altogether, the government pursue 
a ‘death by a thousand cuts’ approach.161 The idea here was that Nutting would be 
asked to make so many deletions that the resultant Swiss-cheese quality of the text 
would render it unreadable. Although Wilson doubted ‘Nutting will prove to be a 
gentleman’, he thanked Heath for his plan and considered it worth a try.162  
On 17 April, Trend informed Nutting that he would be required to omit or 
alter passages that: affected security; revealed the identities and private views of 
members of the Diplomatic Service; damaged international relations; and breached 
the convention of collective responsibility.163  Playing for time, he explained that, 
while it would be fairly easy for the government to draw up a list of passages relating 
to points one and two, it was more complex to do so for the latter objections. Nutting 
replied on the same day, claiming in his defence that Suez was a ‘departure’ from 
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every convention that had underpinned British diplomacy throughout history.164 ‘It 
was for this reason’, he continued, ‘that I resigned, which clearly absolves me from 
that “collective responsibility” to which you refer’.165  
On 20 April, in a bid to ‘reach a meeting of minds’, he and his publisher (Ben 
Glazebrook) met with Trend and Gore-Booth at the Cabinet Office, but not before 
everyone had taken lunch at Trend’s private members’ club, a sign perhaps that 
officials clung to the hope that, even at the eleventh hour, the matter could be resolved 
by gentlemanly means.166 According to Gore-Booth’s minutes, Trend ‘showed great 
skill in taking a firm line while keeping a possibly explosive temperature down’.167 
Nutting nevertheless stood his ground. Under pressure to delete the two chapters on 
collusion in their entirety—on the basis that they revealed intimate conversations 
between officials—he countered that this would ‘suppress the essential truth’ and 
‘completely ruin the book’, before seizing on the precedents of Churchill, Eden and 
Mayhew, whose books were replete with departures from the rules.168 When Trend 
suggested that historians would eventually discover the ‘truth’ about Sèvres from 
documents at the Public Record Office, Nutting hit back by saying that, so far as he 
knew, no records of the talks existed. By the end of the verbal sparring, it was clear 
that he would not back down. That evening Trend told the Prime Minister, ‘We 
should assume that Nutting will make a few trivial arrangements but that otherwise 
the book will appear much in its present form’.169   
On 26 April, Wilson formally decided not to take legal action against the 
book, but only after a lengthy discussion with the Attorney General, Elwyn Jones. 
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Although we should be careful of taking his words at face value, it is interesting to 
note that Elwyn later commented that Nutting came within an ‘agonising hair’s 
breadth’ of being prosecuted and struck off the roll of Privy Counsellors, saved only 
by a handful of last-minute changes to the text, which government lawyers concluded 
would reflect positively on him if Number 10 tried to secure an injunction.170 For 
instance, he had omitted references to the dates and times of Cabinet meetings, and 
expunged the names of the Foreign Office officials who had been involved, such as 
Patrick Dean. Wilson notified senior ministers of his decision the next day, causing 
what Barbara Castle described as a ‘hoo-ha’.171 Around the Cabinet table, there was 
shock that Nutting was ‘prepared to endure any social ostracism that will result from 
publishing’ the book.172  
Before serialisation commenced on 29 April, Gore-Booth scrambled to contact 
Eden’s inner circle, to ask them not to comment about the book. Considering it ‘pretty 
dreadful stuff’, Dean agreed to stay quiet.173 So too did Sir John Nicholls, the former 
British Ambassador in Tel Aviv: ‘over the last ten years I have become quite adept at 
leaving people in a state of uncertainty as to whether I was privy to the whole 
deplorable exercise or not, and whether there was anything to be privy to!’174 Guy 
Millard—who considered Nutting ‘an old and rather close friend of mine’, admitting 
that they had dinner in Paris ‘not so very long ago’—was stunned when he learned 
about the book, remarking ‘I find it astonishing that he did not tell me’.175 He too was 
content not to add fuel to the fire. Eden himself proved more difficult to silence. 
When the fate of the book had hung in the balance, his instinct had been to avoid 
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making a statement—for this would require ‘calling in the aid of information which I 
am not prepared to make use of at the present time’.176 When publication became a 
fait accompli, he changed his mind and, to Trend’s horror, demanded that secret 
telegrams between himself and Eisenhower were sent to his seventeenth-century 
manor house in Broad Chalke, Wiltshire.177  For two months he laboured over an 
appropriate reply, receiving advice from Selwyn Lloyd, Heath and others, only to 
change his mind for a third and final time. In the final analysis, as Nutting had 
remarked, for Eden ‘to revel the truth now would invoke an act of confession too 
mortifying for any man to volunteer’.178 
In terms of international relations, No End of a Lesson did not have the large 
and deleterious consequences of which the Foreign Office had ominously warned, at 
least so far as publicly available sources suggest. As David Carlton has claimed, the 
author’s delay in opening up, however honourable and constitutionally correct, 
‘deprived him of his chance to shape history’.179 By 1967, the secret manoeuvring 
behind Eden’s squalid little war in Egypt had already been unearthed by a motley 
band of journalists, historians and opposition politicos, meaning that Nutting’s 
authentication amounted to reinforcement rather than revelation. Moreover, 
publication coincided with the Six-Day War, when Nasser’s apparent determination to 
wipe Israel off the map convinced even some of Eden’s harshest critics to 
acknowledge that he might have been right about the Egyptian ruler all along. From 
the perspective of 1967, arguably the most provocative disclosure in the book was in a 
                                                        
176 BUL, AP 20/49/21, Eden to Brook, 24 Apr. 1967.   
177 Murphy, ‘Telling Tales’, pp. 209–10.  
178 TNA, CAB 164/1295, J.M. Moss, ‘Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson’, 6 May 1975. 




different area entirely, namely Eden’s belief that Britain should stay out of the 
incipient European Common Market.180 
In terms of official secrecy, however, the impact was considerable. The book 
was another high-profile example of ‘instant history’ that officials had been powerless 
to stop. ‘The autobiography is now almost a customary gratuity on retirement from 
service in high office’, reflected the Conservative grandee Lord Butler, delivering the 
Romanes Lecture at the University of Oxford on 22 November 1967.181 In Whitehall, 
it was clear that people would draw encouragement from Nutting’s refusal to play by 
the rules. As Trend lamented, ‘We cannot hope to put this particular clock back; we 
have to bend our efforts to ensuring, so far as we can, that it does not go too far 
forward’.182  
It did not take long for confirmation of this reality. After leaving parliament in 
late 1967, George Wigg began planning his memoirs and bullishly made Trend aware 
that ‘I do not consider myself bound to play cricket when others have abandoned the 
bat, stumps, and the ball for a shillelagh’.183 In 1969, officials were powerless to stop 
the publication of The Eden Legacy and the Decline of British Diplomacy by the 
senior civil servant Geoffrey McDermott, who had been the head of the Permanent 
Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD), the point of liaison between the Foreign 
Office and the SIS.184 Inspired by Nutting, McDermott’s book caused secret-keepers 
particular anguish because he became the first official to talk publicly about the work 
of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), Britain’s senior intelligence assessment 
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body. As a result, they were terrified that the lid was now about to come off the 
secrets of the spy world, which it duly did in the 1970s with insider revelations about 
the Double-Cross System and Bletchley Park by the ex-intelligence officers John 
Masterman and Frederick Winterbotham respectively.185        
In fear of what Richard Crossman might be muttering into the tape-recorder at 
the weekend down on his North Oxfordshire farm, Wilson instructed key officials to 
search for a solution, but to no avail. The rule that ex-ministers were duty-bound to 
respect collective responsibility had ‘very much eroded’, according to Sir William 
Armstrong, then Head of the Home Civil Service.186 Meanwhile, despite being drawn 
up in a way that theoretically criminalised even the most trivial of unauthorised 
disclosures (for example, the colour of Selwyn Lloyd’s trilby when he visited Sèvres), 
the Official Secrets Act was a meaningless weapon when dealing with the political 
top brass. As Trend reported, ‘We have no sanction by which to enforce suggestions 
for amendment; we have to rely on the goodwill and the sense of public duty of those 
with whom we are dealing. We are therefore driven, to put it bluntly, to bargain and to 
compromise’.187 Problematically, as exemplified by Wigg’s quip about cricket, that 
ability to settle disputes by means of gentlemanly persuasion had also been shattered. 
The accusation of ‘letting the side down’—the ultimate insult among members of the 
British upper class—did not carry the same weight as it had done in the past. Being 
branded a ‘bad chap’ for communicating privileged information outside of the club 
was no longer the kiss of death—a reflection, perhaps, of wider changes in British 
social attitudes and behaviour that occurred in the 1960s. After Suez, with so many 
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political careers ending in ignominy, the desire for broader public rehabilitation 






In a 2004 article for the English Historical Review, Richard Aldrich described the 
British secret state as an ‘empire of secrecy’, with the denizens of Whitehall 
performing the role of colonial governors, battling to protect sensitive information 
from journalists and other writers who resembled native agitators.188 In thinking about 
when this empire started to show signs of overstretch and yield to a rising tide of 
exposure, it is important to recognise Suez as a significant moment. Just as the crisis 
functioned as an obituary notice for Britain’s actual imperial possessions and 
pretensions, it also had lasting consequences for the ‘empire of secrecy’. In its wake, 
secret-keepers struggled to keep fundamental elements hidden, not only from 
parliamentary campaigners and outsiders such as historians keen to discover the truth 
behind the fiasco, but also from senior insiders determined to pen ‘instant’ self-
exculpating memoirs, who were more sinned against than sinning and not easily 
intimidated by the threat of prosecution. The biggest challenge came from an unlikely 
source in Anthony Eden, the person with the most to lose from public revelation of 
what took place at Sèvres. Despite being the archetype of a so-called ‘good chap’—
son of a Durham aristocrat, Eton ‘popper’, Christ Church, and handsome to boot—
Eden flouted the rules of secrecy in a relentless and bloody-minded pursuit of 
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vindication. Even for historians versed in the dying culture of honourable secrecy, it is 
hard not to be struck by the hypocrisy, dishonesty and self-interest that masqueraded 
as high principle in his case. 
The proliferation of disgruntled former statesmen writing memoirs about Suez 
damaged the already threadbare structures of secrecy, since every book provided a 
precedent in terms of what could be disclosed by ex-ministers, while simultaneously 
whipping up protest from historians who criticised the hypocrisy and injustice of 
servants of the Crown profiting from information denied to others. Each new book 
that pushed the boundaries of revelation was a portent of future troubles, which was 
why officials fought so hard to obstruct such works. Interestingly, from the 
perspective of foreign relations, the fallout from these publications was less severe 
than had been predicted. While subsequent Conservative and Labour governments 
worried that a rehashing of the Suez crisis and allegations of American perfidy might 
harm current Anglo-American relations, the Americans themselves regarded this 
seismic domestic disaster as little more than a half-forgotten sideshow.  
Suez exposed the flaws in the secret state’s arsenal of information control. By 
the time of the Nutting imbroglio, it was clear that the Official Secrets Act did not 
hold any deterrent value for senior politicians, because they knew that it would never 
be invoked against them. Despite its impotence as a weapon against the great and the 
good, it is nevertheless important to note that officials never seriously entertained 
abolishing it, for they recognised that it still had a disciplining effect on the Whitehall 
rank and file. Indeed, one of the postscripts to this story is that while establishment 
figures escaped prosecution for their secrecy offences, the same cannot be said of 
relatively junior officials and less prominent civilians. In 1977, for example, in what 




left-wing journalists, Duncan Campbell and Crispin Aubrey, plus a former soldier 
turned social worker, for exchanging information about UK signals intelligence 
operations.189 All three were found guilty of breaking the Act, but avoided custodial 
sentences. In late 2003, Katherine Gun, a young translator for GCHQ, was tried under 
the Act for leaking to The Observer details of a secret US plan to tap the phones of 
UN Security Council members who might vote against the invasion of Iraq. Although 
she ultimately walked free, her case, like the ABC trial, hints at a two-tier system 
whereby smaller fry are prosecuted in the vain hope of intimidating those against 
whom it is deemed impossible to bring the full force of the law.190  
Crucially, Suez weakened the social and cultural foundations of official 
secrecy, upon which legal and bureaucratic mechanisms were ultimately built. In 
dealing with elites intent on disclosure, the most severe threat had always been that of 
casting that person into the social outer darkness, perceived by their peers and friends 
as having betrayed a sacred confidence fostered from infancy, through schooling and 
beyond. In short, secrecy was as much a personal as professional matter. After Suez, 
however, which destroyed reputations, and amid social and cultural transformations, 
respect for the arcane, unspoken rules of gentlemanly conduct dwindled. Anxious to 
achieve some measure of public rehabilitation, Eden and Nutting were completely 
unswayed by the social hazards of communicating information outside of the club, 
horrifying mandarins such as Brook, Trend and Gore-Booth, who were cut from the 
same respectable cloth, or so they thought, and had banked on the power of the old 
codes of what was permissible. In broader scholarly debates now taking place about 
whether, in the twenty-first century, we are witnessing an ‘end to secrecy’ and the rise 
                                                        
189 R.J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored History of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency (London, 2010), pp. 
359–61.   




of a ‘transparent society’, 1956 deserves attention, for this was when respect for 
secrecy, based on a particular set of social structures, friendships and relationships, 
suffered a serious blow.   
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